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Legislative redistricting is “the nastiest form of politics that there is” 
according to Rep. Lynn Westmoreland, the Vice Chairman of the House 
Republican Redistricting Committee in 2010.1  Redistricting occurs every 
ten years, following the national decennial census and most states, 
including Florida, allow their legislatures to reapportion their state 
legislative and federal congressional districts.  Because of the partisan 
nature of the redistricting process, the newly drawn districts will affect, and 
can unduly skew, electoral outcomes for the decade to come.  In states such 
as Florida, where a single party controls both chambers of the state 
legislature, redistricting can devolve from a standard practice of partisan 
gamesmanship whereby some party equanimity in the redistricting process 
can be achieved, to outright gerrymandering on the part of the controlling 
party.2 
When a single party controls both state legislative chambers, it 
provides them virtually unfettered power in the redistricting process, 
especially in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shelby County 
v. Holder striking down the preclearance provision of the Voting Rights 
Act.3  A party fully in control of the decennial redistricting process now has 
carte blanche to take steps to solidify its majority hold on state legislative 
chambers and congressional districts for the ensuing decade and can 
completely hinder any chance the minority may have of regaining majority 
control at the state or federal level.4   This will also often result in 
disproportionate representation in the legislative body in comparison to the 
political makeup of the state’s body politic.  If sustained over time, 
gerrymandering can ultimately skew a state’s partisan representation to the 
point where one party holds a supermajority in both legislative houses, and 
                                                                                                     
 1. Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of/309084/. 
 2. See Gerrymandering, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at http://www. 
britannica.com/ EBchecked/topic/231865/gerrymandering (explaining that in 1812, 
Massachusetts Gov. Eldridge Gerry, signed a bill creating state a senate district distinctly 
resembling a salamander to ensure that the state Senate remained in control of the 
Democratic Republican Party despite the House and governorship being swept by the 
Federalist Party). 
 3. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (striking down § 4(b) of 
the Voting Rights Act). 
 4. See Sari Horowitz, Justice Department to Challenge States’ Voting Laws, WASH. 
POST (July 25, 2013) (“Hours after [the] Supreme Court ruling on voting rights, Texas 
Attorney general Greg Abbott said the state would move forward with its voter ID law and 
would carry out redistricting changes that had been mired in court battles.”).  
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can run roughshod over the minority party regardless of any political or 
electoral efforts it may undertake. 
Gerrymandering is a nationwide problem that is significantly skewing 
the country’s political landscape without even considering the raft of voter 
ID laws recently enacted by Republican controlled state legislatures.5  In 
the 2012 election cycle, Democrats received 1.4 million more votes in 
elections for the House of Representatives, but Republicans maintained 
control of the House by 33 seats.  States occasionally make efforts to raise 
the issue of gerrymandering6 but, regardless of their success or failure, 
gerrymandering quickly recedes from the public consciousness and is 
quickly replaced in the zeitgeist by memes and images that propagate an 
overarching belief that one party is dominant on a state and national scale, 
such as that below.7 
 
                                                                                                     
 5. The restrictive voter ID laws passed in North Carolina, Texas, Pennsylvania, etc., 
will not be further discussed herein. 
 6. See, e.g., FLA. DEPT. OF ELEC., PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS TO BE 
VOTED ON NOVEMBER 2, 2010, available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/publications/pdf/ 
2010/2010ConstitutionalAmendmentsEnglishOMIT379.pdf (highlighting that Amendments 
5 & 6 set forth fair districting requirements for state legislative and congressional districts, 
discussed infra). 
 7. See Stephen Wolf, Political Geography Part 5: Mapping the US Congressional 
Elections and Comparing to the Presidential, DAILY KOS (Mar. 12, 2013) http://www. 
dailykos.com/story/2013/03/12/1191706/-Political-Geography-Part-5-Mapping-the-US-
Congressional-Elections# (red blocks reflect districts voting for Mitt Romney in the 2012 
presidential election). 
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These maps are widely distributed on social media and do not take into 
account the massive population of registered opposition voters hidden 
beneath the red and blue painted counties.  Further, as mapping technology 
has improved in recent decades, these districts are arranged to appear 
compact and reasonable, but in many cases, such as in Florida, Arizona, 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, Virginia, 
Wisconsin and Texas, the result create legislatures that are more politically 
skewed than ever before.8 
The extreme partisan divide of the current political climate extends to 
the states where sustained gerrymanders over multiple redistricting periods 
can lead to a virtual lockout of the minority party in state legislatures at the 
time of reapportionment, even in cases where that minority is supported by 
a majority of registered voters in the state.  The gerrymander creates 
statistical improbabilities such that a minority of voters can actually obtain 
a majority of legislative seats.  In states such as Florida, it is incongruous 
that there are over 500,000 more registered Democrats than Republicans 
and the state has voted for Democrats in four of the last six presidential 
                                                                                                     
 8. See Sam Wang, Op-Ed., The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-2012. 
html (using statistical tools to find partisan gerrymandering in these ten states). 
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elections,9 yet the Republican Party holds a 2-to-1 advantage in 
representation within its Congressional Delegation and a virtual 
supermajority in both state legislative houses.10  The Republican advantage 
in Florida’s state and federal legislative delegations that was entrenched 
during the 2002 reapportionment was only strengthened following the 2012 
reapportionment despite the continued advantage of registered Democrats. 
Until 2004, federal courts would consider whether a purely political 
gerrymander violated the Equal Protection clause, but have since deemed 
such claims non-justiciable.  However, a redistricting pattern reflecting 
significantly disproportionate political gerrymandering over a lengthy 
period of time, as has occurred in Florida, may belie a blueprint to reviving 
purely political gerrymandering as a justiciable question, and it may 
provide the courts with guidelines to permit intervention.  Although such a 
blueprint may be efficacious in other states and despite what could be 
considered a systematic pattern of disenfranchisement of Democratic 
voters’ preferences in Florida, it is unlikely that the courts would apply 
such to Florida due to the simple fact that 22% of all registered voters in 
Florida are not affiliated with the major parties (“Non-Party Affiliates” or 
“NPAs”).11 
The below will focus on the history and standards of the courts’ 
consideration of purely political gerrymandering and its current status.  
Specifically, that despite the creeping invidiousness of gerrymandering, the 
courts will no longer consider whether purely political gerrymandering 
violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12  It will 
also discuss the changing political landscape of Florida legislative districts 
over the course of the past twenty years, with a specific focus to 
                                                                                                     
       9      There may be an argument that Democrats have won, or should have won, Florida 
in five of the last six presidential elections, but that is a topic for many other articles. 
 10. Aaron Deslatte & Kathleen Haughney, Despite Changes, Not Much Different in 
the State Legislature, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Nov. 7, 2012), http://articles.orlando 
sentinel.com/2012-11-07/news/os-florida-legislative-outcome-20121107_1_gop-agenda-
florida-republicans-state-senate-seats (“Despite nearly 500,000 more registered Democrats 
than Republicans statewide, Republicans were poised to hold onto 76 of their 81 seats in the 
120-member Florida House and lost only two seats in the Senate to keep a 26-14 majority.”). 
 11. FLA. DEPT. OF ELEC., COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION BY PARTY ( October 9, 2012), 
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/pdf/2012/GEN2012_County 
Party.pdf [hereinafter COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION 2012]. 
 12. See U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; . . . nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
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redistricting following the 2000 and 2010 censuses and the manner in 
which these changes have resulted in a virtual lockout of Democrats from 
state politics.  It will also synopsize how these changes may be applied to 
the strictures providing for judicial action in the case of purely political 
gerrymandering as violative of equal protection set forth in Davis v. 
Bandemer.13   Finally, it will discuss recent constitutional amendments to 
the Florida Constitution to prohibit political considerations in redistricting, 
the current lawsuit focusing on their enforcement and how other states have 
attempted to bring equanimity to the political process of redistricting. 
For the purpose of this discussion, “safe” district means there is greater 
than a 53/47% partisan split in voter registration, “leaning” district means 
that there is a 51-52.9% partisan advantage between registered party voters, 
and “toss-up” means that the partisan split of registered voters lies between 
49.1%-50.9%.14  All electoral and voter registration figures have been 
derived from the Florida Department of State Division of Elections15, and 






                                                                                                     
 13. See Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2816 (1986) (holding “political 
gerrymandering cases are properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause”). 
 14. See Redistricting and Incumbent Protection in 2001-2002, VOTING AND 
DEMOCRACY RESEARCH CENTER, http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=715 (last visited Mar. 3, 
2013) (defining a “safe” district as having a 55/45% partisan split, and a “highly 
competitive” district as having a 53/47% partisan split.  However, after analyzing two 
decades of electoral data, in Florida, “safe” districts tend to comport with the definition in 
the body of text). 
 15. Voter Registration Statistics – By Election, FLA. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION 
OF ELECTIONS, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/elections.shtml (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Voter Registration Statistics]. 
 16. Compare FLA. DEPT. OF ELEC., COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION BY PARTY (Oct. 11, 
1994), http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/pdf/1994/94genparty.pdf, 
with FLA. DEPT. OF ELEC., COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION BY PARTY, Oct. 7, 2002, http:// 
election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/pdf/2002/2002genparty.pdf, and FLA. 
DEPT. OF ELEC., COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION BY PARTY (Oct. 9, 2012), http:// 
election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/pdf/2012/GEN2012_CountyParty.pdf (sig-
nifying that Florida NPA voter populace has increased from 8.6% in 1994, to 16.5% in 2002 
and to 22% in 2012). 
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I.  Gerrymandering as a Justiciable Question 
A.  Davis v. Bandemer & the Era of Justiciability 
The modern consideration of gerrymandering arose citing challenges 
to voting rights from racial discrimination, first in Baker v. Carr,17 followed 
by a litany of cases. 18 The Baker court dealt primarily with the issue of race 
related gerrymandering, holding that the “equal protection clause is not 
diminished by the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights.”19 
Additionally, the Baker court laid out the standard by which an issue 
was “justiciable” before the court, or whether it was a purely political 
question to which the federal courts could not grant jurisdiction.  
Specifically, political questions may have many elements which “identify it 
as essentially a function of the separation of powers,” including whether 
there is a textual constitutional commitment to a specific political 
department, the “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolution, the “impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination,” the “impossibility of undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government,” 
“the unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision” or 
                                                                                                     
 17. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187 (1962) (questioning the constitutionality of a 
Tennessee apportionment statute on the basis that it led to a debasement of certain citizens’ 
votes in certain counties). 
 18. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 119 (1986) (citing Rogers v. Lodge, 458 
U.S. 613, 627–28 (1982) (holding that an at-large electoral system maintained for diluting 
the African American vote was invalid and ordered use of single member districts)) (stating 
that without population deviation, racial gerrymandering presents a justiciable question); see 
also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 80 (1980) (holding that an at-large electoral system did 
not violate the African American population’s Fifteenth Amendment rights); White v. 
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973) (holding that the establishment of multimember districts 
was proper given history of discrimination against minorities); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 
U.S. 124, 124 (1971) (considering question of multimember district reapportionment’s 
affects on the district minority population); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966) 
(holding that improperly proportioned multimember districts do not automatically result in 
invidious discrimination when election outcome does not substantially differ from “that 
which would result from use of a permissible population base”); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 
433, 436 (1965) (holding that multimember districts did not devalue votes in comparison to 
that of single-member district constituents). 
 19. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209–10 (quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 
(1944)). 
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the potential embarrassment from pronouncements by multiple departments 
on a single question.20 
Over time, and in areas not covered explicitly by the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, claimants brought actions asserting unconstitutional 
gerrymandering arising from purely political discrimination as between 
Republicans and Democrats.  In 1986, the Supreme Court determined for 
the first time, in Davis v. Bandemer,21 that gerrymandering was a justiciable 
question when the only affected class was a political party itself.22  
Bandemer involved claims by the Indiana Democratic Party that the 
Republican Party had unconstitutionally gerrymandered the state legislative 
districts to disproportionately preclude the Democrats their representational 
voice.23  Following the 1981 redistricting overseen by the Republican Party, 
Democratic candidates for the Indiana House received a majority of the 
statewide votes (51.9%), but won only 43 of 100 seats.24   Additionally, the 
Democratic senatorial candidates received 53.1% of the statewide vote, but 
received only a bare majority of the seats, 13 of 25.25 
In so deeming the question of purely political gerrymandering 
justiciable, the Davis court wrote at length, noting that the creation of 
districts that would “‘minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or 
political elements of the voting population’ would raise a constitutional 
question.”26 While mere political gamesmanship did not warrant 
overturning redistricting under the Fourteenth Amendment, efforts to dilute 
a political party’s voting power warranted review: 
Since the achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens is 
concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment, we conclude that 
[T]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal 
participation by all voters in the election of State legislators. Diluting the 
weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic 
                                                                                                     
 20. Id. at 217. 
 21. 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (holding “that political gerrymandering cases are 
properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Class”). 
 22. See id. at 124–27 (stating that “each political group in a state should have the same 
chance to elect representatives of it choice as any other political group”). 
 23. See generally Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 24. Id. at 115. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 119 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)). 
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constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as 
invidious discriminations based upon factors such as race....27  
The Bandemer court declined to act and overturn the gerrymandered 
districts in Indiana despite apparent sympathies to the opponents of political 
gerrymandering.  The Court noted that redistricting merely makes it more 
difficult to for a particular group to prevail is not per se unconstitutional 
because there is a perception that even the losing faction will be able to 
influence the political process by their simple continued involvement in 
engaging the candidates and elected officials.28 
In so striking down the Indiana Democrats’ claim of unconstitutional 
gerrymandering, the Court notes that there was no finding by the lower 
court as to whether the Democrats could retake either legislative body, 
whether they would be resigned to a minority status for the entire decade, or 
whether they would fair better following reapportionment subsequent to the 
1990 census.29  The Bandemer court analogized the Democrats’ losses in 
Indiana to Whitcomb v. Chavis,30 stating that the “failure to have legislative 
seats in proportion to its populations emerges more as a function of losing 
elections than of built-in bias” and that “canceled out” votes are a 
euphemism for political defeat.31  “Only when such placement affects 
election results and political power statewide has an actual disadvantage 
occurred.”32  They essentially held that as this was the first election 
following the redistricting, it was possible that Democrats could retake the 
legislature, and a wait and see approach was more appropriate than 
involving the judiciary in every potential case of political gerrymandering. 
Unfortunately, the Court did not provide clear guidance as to the 
required findings allowing courts to intervene when purely political 
gerrymandering is found to purposefully disenfranchise an entire party from 
involvement in a state’s political activity.  In holding that a claim against 
political gerrymandering could succeed only in the event that “intentional 
                                                                                                     
 27. Id. at 123–24 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565–66 (1964)). 
 28. Id. at 131–32 (“[T]he mere fact that a particular apportionment scheme makes it 
more difficult for a particular group in a particular district to elect the representatives of its 
choice does not render that scheme constitutionally infirm.”). 
 29. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 135–36 (1986) (stating the findings of the 
District Court).  
 30. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160 (holding that an apportionment 
scheme did not comply with the requirements of the equal protection clause). 
 31. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 137. 
 32. Id. at 141. 
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discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual 
discriminatory effect on that group,” the plurality did not go so far as to lay 
out a specific framework to guide the courts as to when intervention is 
appropriate.33  As a result, a number of cases of purely political 
gerrymandering were reviewed as justiciable, but no action was taken.34 
B.  Vieth v. Jubelirer & Regression to Nonjusticiability 
In 2004, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of purely 
political gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer,35 which wholly overturned 
Bandemer, declaring the question nonjusticiable.36  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Scalia stated that the effects prong of Bandemer would be 
very difficult to meet because it would have to take into account “a variety 
of historic factors and projected election results, [that] the [effected] group 
had been ‘denied its chance to effectively influence the political process’ as 
a whole, which could be achieved even without electing a candidate.”37  In 
so reasoning, Justice Scalia relies on the Bandemer provision that in a 
statewide challenge to redistricting, the “inquiry centers on the voters’ 
direct or indirect influence on the elections of the state legislature as a 
whole.”38 
The Court also reasoned that equal protection under the Constitution 
does not guarantee equal representation in government to equivalently sized 
groups.39  While the dissenting justices set forth several theorems whereby 
                                                                                                     
 33. See id. at 127. 
 34. See Duckworth v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 322 F.3d 769, 774 (4th Cir. 
2003) (stating that strangely shaped districts are, alone, not sufficient to show 
unconstitutional gerrymandering absent actual discriminatory effects on an identifiable 
group); see also Smith v. Boyle, 144 F.3d 1060, 1068 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that the denial 
of equal protection must be shown to be intentional to warrant intervention); LaPorte Cnty. 
Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bd .of Com’rs of Cnty. of LaPorte, 43 F.3d 1126, 1128   (7th 
Cir. 1994) (redistricting for at-large county commission seats is not actionable without 
showing affected balance between political parties); O’Lear v. Miller, 222 F. Supp. 2d  850 
(E.D. Mich. 2002) (using the analysis in Davis v. Bandemer to assess plaintiff’s equal 
protection claim); Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022 
(D. Md. 1994) (holding that state’s motion for summary judgment is granted because 
plaintiffs failed to satisfy the two-part test outlined in Davis v. Bandemer). 
 35. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 36. Id. at 306. 
 37. Id. at 283 (quoting Bandemer, 478 U.S 109, 132 (1986)). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 287. 
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the courts could deem political gerrymandering unconstitutional, including 
Justices Breyer’s definition that such occurred via “the unjustified use of 
political factors to entrench a minority in power,” the majority rejected all 
such reasoning as too inexact to adequately delineate guidance for finding 
actionable scenarios.40  Ultimately, the reversal of Bandemer was based 
upon the Court’s assertion that it was unworkable and the courts are 
incapable of principled application of its strictures.41 
However, Justice Kennedy held out hope that political gerrymandering 
may again be a justiciable question.  Justice Kennedy concurred with the 
outcome in Veith based on the facts before the court, but he made an effort 
to note that a purely political gerrymander will violate equal protection 
upon a “conclusion that the classifications [utilized], though generally 
permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to 
any legitimate legislative objective” as legislative redistricting should 
establish “fair and effective representation for all citizens.”42  While a 
“manageable standard” to deal with illegitimate partisan gerrymandering 
had not yet been found, that does not preclude the possibility that such a 
standard will come to light.43 
II.  The Odd Case of Gerrymandering in Florida 
“Fair and effective representation for all citizens” is a just and valid 
goal, although not one that is often sought by either major party.  It is in the 
self-interests of political parties and politicians to maintain power once a 
majority is achieved or a seat is won.  In its traditional sense, Gerry-
mandering will often simply reinforce and institutionalize majority power, 
                                                                                                     
 40. Id. at 292–305 (Stevens, J dissenting) (reasoning that political gerrymandering be 
subject to strict scrutiny as suppression of political speech under the First Amendment is not 
discernable in the Constitution; Justice Souter’s five part test showing that the plaintiff is the 
member of a cohesive political group, that no heed was paid to traditional districting 
principles, there were specific deviations from traditional districting principles and the 
distribution of the group’s population, that a hypothetical district exists remedying packing 
and cracking, and there was intentional manipulation of the district to pack and crack the 
group does not work, because Justice Souter does not elucidate what is being tested for; 
Justice Breyer’s unjust entrenchment of the minority is too nebulous, and he gives no 
instance of permanent frustration of the majority’s will, and; Justice Kennedy’s wait and see 
approach has already failed).  
 41. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305–06 (2004). 
 42. Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 43. Id. at 311. 
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which likewise often reflects a majority of the population (or one that is 
nearly evenly split by political alliance). 
In that regard, however, Florida poses a somewhat unique situation.  
Florida is a “swing state” on the national level but the makeup of its 
legislature and congressional delegation do not remotely reflect the political 
alliances held by its populace.  As of the 2012 general election, Florida had 
500,000 more registered Democrats than Republicans, forty-one of sixty-
seven counties had more registered Democrats than Republicans,44 the 
Republican governor, who won by a 1.2% margin, had a 39% approval 
rating,45 the voters again cast a majority of ballots for President Obama, and 
yet Republicans held 17 of 27 congressional seats,46 26 of 40 state Senate 
seats,47 and 76 of 120 state House seats.48 
 
                                                                                                     
 44. COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION 2012, supra note 10 (including nearly all of the 
most populous counties, Broward, Palm Beach, Miami-Dade, Duval, Orange, Pinellas, 
Hillsborough, Polk and Volusia.  Seminole, Lee, Pasco & Sarasota Counties maintain 
Republican majorities). 
 45. Jeremy Wallace, Is Romney Campaign Avoiding Rick Scott?, SARASOTA HERALD 
TRIB., Nov. 2, 2012. 
 46. Members of the H.R., FLA. H.R. J. (1991); Members of the S., FLA. S. J., (1991). 
 47. 2012–2014 Senators, THE FLA. S., http://www.flsenate.gov/Senators/ (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2013). 
 48. Representatives for Regular Session 2013, FLA. H.R., http://www.myflorida 
house.gov/ sections/representatives/representatives.aspx?SessionId=73 (last visited Apr. 10, 
2013). 
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A.  The 1990s 
During the 1990 census, Democrats held a solid majority in the House 
and a small majority in the Senate, allowing them to control the 
redistricting process.49  There is limited electronically available information 
pertaining to the voter registration statistics available for Florida pre-1994, 
however it does not appear that the Democrats took significant or effective 
efforts to increase their majorities via redistricting as following the 1992 
elections there was no change in the membership makeup of the House, in 
which they held a seventy-four-seat majority, and they actually lost a seat in 
the Senate.50  Additionally, while Florida gained four Congressional seats, 
only a single additional seat went to Democrats in the 1992 election.51  
Moreover, there were no challenges to the 1992-redistricting plan asserting 
                                                                                                     
 49. See Members of the H.R., FLA. H.R. J. (1992) (House: 74-46); Members of the S., 
FLA S. J. (1992) (Senate: 22-18). 
 50. See Members of the H.R., FLA. H.R. J. (1994); Members of the S., FLA. S. J., 
(1994). 
51. See Dango, The 1991–1992 redistricting cycle, RED RACING HORSES (Oct. 21, 
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that there was impermissible, purely political gerrymandering.  Rather, the 
challenges to the 1992-plan regarded alleged racial gerrymandering.52 
The 1994 election cycle was an odd year in electoral politics with the 
Newt Gingrich led Republicans running on the Contract with America.  The 
Republican Party as a whole placed unprecedented pressure on “Southern” 
and “Blue Dog” Democrats, those with traditionally conservative leanings 
in somewhat conservative districts to retire, switch parties or face a strong 
Republican challenge.53  Many congressional Democrats either retired or 
switched parties, which was felt down ticket as well, especially in North 
Florida and the Panhandle, which are traditionally more conservative than 
the metropolitan regions and areas south of Orlando.54 
Following the 1994 elections, there was a drop off in Democrats 
represented in the Florida legislature, with a low-point membership in the 
House of 45 seats, and in the Senate of 15 seats during the 1990 census 
cycle.55  However, other national political events likely depressed 
Democratic voters and/or rallied Republicans, such as the Monica 
Lewinsky scandal being in the media forefront leading up to the 1998-
midterm elections. However, during this decade, Democrats only lost a total 
of 8 “safe” state House seats and 3 “safe” Senate seats.56 
Throughout the 1990s, the districts that were considered “safe” for 
each party were fairly stable as to their partisan makeup.  In the “safe” 
Democratic House districts, on average and between the two major parties, 
there was a 66/34% split between Democratic and Republican voters 
respectively; whereas in the Republican “safe” districts, there was a 61/39% 
split between Republican and Democrats. Similarly, in the “safe” 
Democratic Senate districts there was a 66/34% split between registered 
                                                                                                     
 52. See Lawyer v. Dep’t. of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997);  De Grandy v. 
Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Fla. 1992);  Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 
(1994);  Johnson v. Smith, No. TCA 94-40025-WS, 1994 WL 907596 (N.D. Fla. July 18, 
1994);  Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. 1529 (N.D. Fla. 1995);  Johnson v. Mortham, 926 
F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Fla. 1996);  Johnson v. Mortham, No. TCA 94-40025-MMP, 1996 WL 
297280 (N.D. Fla. May 31, 1996);  Fouts v. Harris,  88 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (S.D. Fla. 1999), 
aff’d sub nom. Chandler v. Harris, 529 U.S. 1084 (2000). 
 53. See Bruce Bartlett, The Dismal Future of the GOP, FORBES.COM, May 1, 2009, 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/30/specter-future-gop-opinions-columnists-bartlett.html 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2013). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See Members of the H.R., FLA. H.R. J. (2000); Members of the S., FLA. S. J. (2000). 
 56. The 2000 Democrats had 53 “safe” House districts and 45 seats, 18 “safe” Senate 
districts and 15 seats. 
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Democrats and Republicans.  In the “safe” Republican districts, the split 
was 59/41%.57 
Following the 2002 reapportionment, there were slight but significant 
changes to the House district partisan splits and a larger change to the 
Senate districts, both of which appear to have had dramatic results 
effectively ensconcing the Republican Party’s power in Florida for the 
entirety of the 2000s and seemingly beyond.58 
                                                                                                     
 57. See Voter Registration Statistics, supra note 15. 
 58. See Sasha Abramsky, The Redistricting Wars, THE NATION (Dec. 11, 2003), 
http://archive.fairvote.org/redistricting/reports/remanual/frames.htm (explaining that, “en-
tirely due to redistricting,” the Republicans expanded their majority). 
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B.  The 2000s and the Challenge to Purely Political Gerrymandering 
As of the 2000 decennial census, the Republican Party had control of 
both houses of the Florida Legislature by margins of 75 to 45 and 25 to 15 
in the House and Senate respectively placing them wholly in control of the 
redistricting process.59  During the 1992 redistricting process, Republicans 
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claimed that Democrats locked the doors to the reapportionment suite in the 
Capitol Building, and Speaker of the House, Daniel Webster asserted that 
the 2002 process would be open to all.60  However, Speaker Webster’s 
statement was made shortly before a security keypad was installed in the 
same office suite, and Democrats were not provided the entry code.61 
Following the 2000 reapportionment, the Democrats immediately filed 
suit alleging racial gerrymandering and a breach of equal protection for 
purely political gerrymandering in Bush v. Martinez.62  A three-judge panel 
in the Federal Southern District of Florida heard the challenge and, as in 
numerous other challenges to voter dilution through political Gerry-
mandering, nothing ultimately came of it. 
The court considered Bandemer but required that a four-part test not 
set forth therein be met to succeed on a claim of political gerrymandering: 
1) the group is sufficiently large and geographically compact enough to 
constitute the majority of a single member district; 2) the group is 
politically cohesive; 3) the party winning the contested seat votes 
sufficiently as a block to enable it, “in absence of special circumstances, 
such as the minority candidate running unopposed, to defeat the minority 
party’s preferred candidate”; and, 4) once the first three factors are meet, 
that the totality of the circumstances reflects vote dilution.63  Interestingly, 
the court did not take into account the population of NPA voters in Florida. 
The Martinez court noted that in political gerrymandering cases, the 
best evidence of political identity will be proof of bloc voting and political 
cohesiveness.64  These will most easily be established by showing that the 
candidates supported by each group are separate, and that each group votes 
                                                                                                     
Chances for DemocraticTakeover within Grasp, MCI MAPS, (July 18, 2013), 
http://mcimaps.com/florida-senate-republican-gerrymander-tilts-odds-but-chances-for-
democratic-takeover-within-grasp/ (“The end result was Democrats losing control of both 
legislative chambers in the 1990s.  Redistricting following the 2000 Census allowed 
Republicans to further gerrymander themselves into a secure majority.”). 
 60. David Royse, Redistricting is a Handy Political Tool, ASSOC. PRESS (Mar. 25, 
2001), http://archive.fairvote.org/redistricting/reports/remanual/flnews2.htm#handy. 
 61. Steve Bousquet, Democrats Fret Over Capitol Office Politics, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES (Nov. 27, 2001), available at http://www.sptimes.com/News/112701/State/Democrats 
_fret_over_C.shtml. 
 62. 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
 63. Id. at 1334–35 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986) (citing 
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011–12 (1994))). 
 64. See id. at 1336. 
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for their candidate with a general mutual exclusivity, which must be shown 
over the course of time, not just a single election.65 
The Democrats were likely hasty in bringing the pure political 
gerrymandering claim in the Martinez action as only a single election had 
occurred under the new reapportionment, as occurred in Bandemer.66  A 
lengthier record could have better reflected the Democrat’s claims in the 
light that they were relegated to essentially become a superminority party 
throughout the decade.  Certainly, there were issues of underperformance, 
but the political gerrymander helped preclude the Democratic Party from 
even the possibility of winning a majority of seats in either state house or of 
obtaining a majority of the congressional delegation. 
1.  Results of the 2002 Reapportionment 
Under the 2002 reapportionment plan, the Democrats were not 
completely shut out of the political process vis-à-vis having no Democratic 
members of the state legislature, but their chances at reestablishing a 
majority in either house were diminished by packing more registered 
Democrats into fewer districts, diluting their vote in surrounding districts 
and thusly creating a statistical improbability that they will be able to 
successfully contest Republican held districts or achieve a Democratic 
majority in either chamber of the Florida Legislature.  Democrats were 
additionally discounted from the Congressional Delegation.67 
The 2002 reapportionment reduced Democratic “safe” districts from 
53 to 46, Democratic leaning districts were reduced from 7 to 3, and there 
was no change in “toss-up” districts, remaining at 9.  Alternatively, 
Republican “safe” districts rose from 43 to 51 and “leaning” districts rose 
from 8 to 11.  This plan resulted in a 22-seat swing in the Republican 
Party’s favor by voter registration. 
                                                                                                     
 65. See id. 
 66. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 135–36 (1986). 
 67. See Voter Registration Statistics, supra note 15. 
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Likewise, in the Senate, Democrats lost 3 traditionally safe seats, 
falling from 18 to 15 seats, while Republicans picked up 2, moving from 16 
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For the Congressional Delegation, Florida was granted 2 additional 
seats, which were swiftly apportioned into “safe” Republican districts, 




While there are issues with Democratic electoral underperformance in 
the late 1990s, the 2002 reapportionment plan essentially codified a 
Republican majority, again despite registered Democrats composing a 
majority of the electorate.68  Following the implementation of the 2000 
redistricting plan, to obtain a bare majority in the House, Democrats would 
have had to sweep all districts with even the smallest Democratic majority, 
as well as all of the “toss-up” districts and steal three Republican districts.  
To regain the Senate, the same would apply in sweeping all of the “toss-up” 
seats.  To gain a majority in the Congressional Delegation, Democrats 
would have to take their districts, the single “toss-up” district, the 2 
Republican “leaning” districts, and a “safe” Republican district, which is 
statistically unlikely as in any given year as this requires a landslide victory 
                                                                                                     
 68. See generally Barbara Giles, Florida Congressional Elections, 1952–2002: A 
Reversal of Party Fortunes, 32 POL. & POL’Y 434 (Nov. 12, 2004), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2004.tb00191.x/asset/j.1747-
1346.2004.tb00191.x.pdf?v=1&t=hn7neivg&s=6ef0b5bea7675541b853aa75b76fc2def3c2b6
37 (examining elections from 1952-2002 and explaining the significance of reapportionment 
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among NPA voters.  Additionally there are generally only 60 state House 
races and 10–12 Senate races in a given year because incumbency 
protection makes running in most districts a waste of time and money. 
2.  Packing and Cracking Democratic Districts 
Gerrymandering is expected to give an advantage to the party 
controlling the redistricting process.  However, it is the invidious packing 
and cracking schemes, increasing the density of the opposition party in 
already controlled districts while diluting their numbers in other districts 
that is at the heart of gerrymandering.  This enables the gerrymandering 
party to strengthen its control of the legislature on one hand and allow them 
to announce that they established and/or protected number of safe 
opposition districts on the other.  The packing and cracking of Democratic 
districts and the strengthening of Republican districts becomes patently 
clear when examined following the 2002 reapportionment.  To this end, the 
“safe” Democratic districts saw an increase in the partisan divide, while the 
Republicans saw a decrease in such while maintaining the “safe” threshold 
of having over 55% of the registered partisan voters in the district. 
The alterations to the Florida House districts were small, but 
significant.  Prior to 2002, the average partisan split in “safe” Democratic 
House districts was 66.9/33.1%.  The post-2002 reapportionment saw a 
2.5% increase in the partisan divide of safe districts to 69.4/30.6%, which 
diluted the power of Democrats in neighboring districts, some of which 
were “leaning” or “toss-ups.” Conversely, Republican “safe” districts saw a 
diminution in the partisan split from 60.7/ 39.3% to 59/41% after the 
reapportionment, which ensured that “safe” seats remained safe and 
bolstered neighboring districts that were “leaning” or “toss-ups.” 
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The 2002 election cycle also saw the second fewest state House races 
of the 2000s, at 46, as well as the fewest “competitive” races in two decades 
with only 3 races that fell under that category as having a 53/47% partisan 
split.69 
 
                                                                                                     
 69. See VOTING AND DEMOCRACY RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 13 (noting that 
“competitive” races have final election results falling within a 55/45% split.  For the 
purposes here, a “competitive” race falls within a 53/47% split).; see also Bandemer, 478 
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The same pattern was seen in the Senate in 2002 with the average 
partisan divide of Democratic voters rising fully 3%, from a 66.2/33.8% 
split to a 69.2/30.8% split in “safe” districts.  The Republican “safe” district 
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This pattern held true to the Congressional districts as well.  The 
Democrats saw an increase in their average partisan split margins in “safe” 
districts of 2.3%, from a 67.5/32.5% split to 69.8/30.2% split.  The 
Republican reapportionment again maintained their safe margins while 
bolstering “leaning” and “toss-up” districts, going so far as to turn some 
Democratic “leaning” districts into “safe” Republican districts.  The most 
obvious occurrence was in the grouping of Districts 20-22, which had 
respective Democrat-to-Republican splits in 2000 of 59/41, 36/64 and 
53/47.  Following the 2002 reapportionment, the partisan splits of Districts 
20-22 were 63/37, 42/58 and 45/55, respectively.  By packing a greater 
percentage of Democrats into Districts 20 and 21, the newly created district 




Absent extraordinary circumstances, reapportionment can place a 
stranglehold on the partisan makeup of a state legislature and its 
congressional delegation.  At times, even extraordinary circumstances can 
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three Florida congressional seats switched parties during the decade, one of 
which was the result of a sex scandal involving underage House pages, and 
all three reverted to Republican control in 2010 with the rise of the Tea 
Party.70 
C.  The 2012 Reapportionment and Amendments to Florida’s Constitution 
Following the 2010 census, Florida gained an additional two seats to 
its congressional delegation, raising the total to 27.  In the same year, 
recognizing the importance of maintaining equitability in the voting 
process, Floridians resoundingly passed two constitutional amendments by 
ballot initiative addressing reapportionment and gerrymandering.71  The 
purpose of the amendments was to prevent further gerrymandering by 
precluding the legislature from reapportioning the districts with the intent to 
protect incumbents, and requiring that the new districts be compact and use 
existing political boundaries.72  The amendments preclude the legislature 
                                                                                                     
 70. Districts 8, 16 and 22 were briefly held by Democrats during the decade.  District 
8 generally “leaned” Republican and is now a “safe” Republican district with a 56.7/43.3%.  
District 16 fell from “safe” to “leaning” Republican following the Mark Foley scandal and 
has again been reestablished as a “safe” Republican district with a 57.8/42.2% split.  District 
22 has since been reapportioned to a “safe” Democratic district. 
 71. Both proposed amendments were passed with over 62% of the vote.  See 
Constitutional Amendments, FLA. DEP’T. OF STATE DIV. OF ELEC. Official Results, 
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initiativelist.asp?year=2010&initstatus=ALL&Made
Ballot=Y&ElecType=GEN; see also Standards for Legislature to Follow in Legislative 
Redistricting, FLA. DEP’T. OF STATE DIV. OF ELEC., http://election.dos.state.fl.us 
/initiatives/initdetail.asp?account=43605&seqnum=2 (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
 72. FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 20–21 (2010): 
SECTION 20. Standards for establishing congressional district 
boundaries.  
In establishing congressional district boundaries: (a) No 
apportionment plan or individual district shall be drawn with the 
intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; and 
districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or 
abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to 
participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect 
representatives of their choice; and districts shall consist of 
contiguous territory. (b) Unless compliance with the standards in 
this subsection conflicts with the standards in subsection (a) or with 
federal law, districts shall be as nearly equal in population as is 
practicable; districts shall be compact; and districts shall, where 
feasible, utilize existing political and geographical boundaries.  (c) 
The order in which the standards within subsections (a) and (b) of 
this section are set forth shall not be read to establish any priority of 
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from taking into account political considerations or consulting with political 
entities in furtherance of the redistricting procedure. 
It is yet to be wholly seen whether the amendments will result in a 
significant shake-up of the representational ratios in the Florida Legislature 
and Congressional Delegation.  However, based on the outcomes of the 
2012 election, as it stands, the amendments did not result in any significant 
shake-up to Florida’s legislative or congressional delegation ratios.  During 
the general election, President Obama did not fair as well as in 2008, but he 
carried Florida by 84,000 votes.  While Democrats gained 2 down ticket 
Congressional seats, bringing their total to ten of twenty-seven seats, they 
held only 37% of the available seats despite receiving 48% of the votes 
statewide.  
In order to obtain a majority of the Florida Congressional Delegation, 
Democrats would need to steal two Republican-leaning seats, which would 
be incredibly difficult to do, needing to overcome an average 46,000-voter 
deficit by registration, as well as win landslides among NPA voters.  
Alternatively, the Democrats have been packed into districts where they 
hold an average advantage in voter registration on Republicans of 114,000 
voters.  The “safe” Democratic districts essentially cannot be won by a 
Republican candidate, but this is preferred by the controlling party under 
the gerrymandered scheme to prevent the possibility of Democrats taking 
seats elsewhere.  The gerrymander continues to be clearly evidenced via the 
                                                                                                     
one standard over the other within that subsection. 
 
SECTION 21. Standards for establishing legislative district 
boundaries. 
In establishing legislative district boundaries: (a) No apportionment 
plan or district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a 
political party or an incumbent; and districts shall not be drawn with the 
intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or 
language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish 
their ability to elect representatives of their choice; and districts shall 
consist of contiguous territory.  (b) Unless compliance with the 
standards in this subsection conflicts with the standards in subsection (a) 
or with federal law, districts shall be as nearly equal in population as is 
practicable; districts shall be compact; and districts shall, where feasible, 
utilize existing political and geographical boundaries.  (c) The order in 
which the standards within subsections (a) and (b) of this section are set 
forth shall not be read to establish any priority of one standard over the 
other within that subsection. 
Id. 
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partisan split in “safe” districts whereby Democrats hold a 68.6/31.4% 
margin, while Republicans hold a 56.7/43.3% margin, which is generally 
sufficient to hold off even legitimate challenges to the seat. 
In reapportioning the state House districts, Democrats gained only 3 
“safe” seats, but lost 2 districts that “lean” Democrat by voter registration 
tally.  The 2012 election results prove the further discouraging effects of 
gerrymandering when Democrats won only 23 of 47 races for the House 
when receiving 120,000 more votes than Republicans in contested races 
and a total of 52% of the popular vote.  Additionally, only 13 races fell into 
the “competitive” category of less than a 53/47% partisan split.  However, 
despite their strong showing at the polls, Democrats gained just 5 seats on 
their previous total, improving to 44 seats, holding just 36.6% of available 
House seats. 
In the state Senate plan, Democrats actually lost a “safe” district, 
Republicans gained a “leaning” district, and a single additional district fell 
into the “toss-up” column.  The breakdown for seat safety in the Senate 
keeps the Democrats at a disadvantage, giving them 14 “safe” seats and 1 
“leaning” seat, while the Republicans have 15 “safe” seats and 5 “leaning” 
seats.  The Democrats would need to sweep all 5 “toss-up” seats over the 
course of two election cycles to simply reach an even split in the state 
Senate.  In winning 2 seats during the 2012 election, the Democrats brought 
their total up to 14 seats. 
As to the Congressional Delegation, Democrats gained no “safe” 
districts, remaining stable at 9 seats and there were no changes to the “toss-
up” districts.  However, the Republican hold strengthened as the two new 
seats granted to the Florida congressional delegation were drawn as safe 
Republican districts.  Overall, the Republican reapportionment resulted in 
12 safe districts, up from 7 in 2010, and a decrease in leaning districts from 
5 to 3. 
With regard to alterations in the partisan splits following the 2012 
reapportionment, there was little change to the Congressional districts.  In 
the Florida House, however, Democratic votes in “leaning” and “toss-up” 
districts were further diluted, with the partisan split in “safe” districts rising 
from an average of 69.4/30.6% to 70.4/29.6%.  In the Senate, the 
Republicans further strengthened their hold on “safe” and “leaning” 
districts by decreasing their density in “safe” districts from a decade 
average of 58.5/41.5% to 57.8/42.2%, ensuring to remain above the 55% 
percent “safe” threshold. 
As a result of the redistricting plan passed by the Republican 
controlled Florida legislature, two primary lawsuits, which have been 
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consolidated for interlocutory appellate purposes, have been filed, alleging 
violations of the amendments, and they are currently pending before the 
Second Judicial Circuit of Florida in Leon County and the Supreme Court 
of Florida.73   The allegations assert that high-ranking staff of the Florida 
House Speaker and Senate President were in frequent contact with 
Republican Party of Florida officials and consultants who were involved in 
analyzing and drafting the 2012 redistricting maps.74  The case is discussed 
further below. 
III.  Applying the Dilution of Democrats’ Voting Power in Florida to 
Bandemer 
Bandemer was effectively killed by Vieth, but its premise remains: that 
purely political gerrymandering results in equal protection violations when 
it is shown that a political group is intentionally discriminated against and 
there is an actual discriminatory effect.  Florida’s reapportionment plans 
and their effects over the course of the past two decades provide a blueprint 
for the required elements for a court to consider when acting on a claim that 
equal protection rights were violated due to purely political 
gerrymandering. 
The following several factors are those that may be considered in 
applying the template and requiring that a court take action to ensure that 
equal protection is applied in the face of a purely political gerrymander: 
• Whether the newly reapportioned districts are compact and 
contiguous, utilizing historical political boundaries where 
possible;  
• Whether the reapportionment is controlled by a single party;  
• Whether that reapportionment significantly weakens the 
political prospects of the party in the minority to elect their 
representatives to Congress or the state legislature;  
                                                                                                     
 73. See The League of Women Voters, et al. v. The Fla. House of Representatives, et 
al., Fla. S. Ct. Case No. SC 13-949, (Fla. 1st DCA Case No. 1D12-5280, Fla. 2d Jud. Cir. 
Case No. 37-2012 CA 00412); see also Romo, et al. v. The Florida House of 
Representatives, et al., Fla. S. Ct. Case No. SC 13-951, (Fla. 1st DCA Case No. 1D12-5280, 
Fla. 2d Jud. Cir. Case No. 37-2012 CA 00490). 
 74. Mary Ellen Klas, Emails Show Legislative Staff Talked with Party Over 
Redistricting Maps, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/ 
2013/02/04/v-fullstory/3217223/emails-show-legislative-staff.html. 
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• Whether the party discriminated against has a majority or 
minority of the registered voters in that state affected;  
• Whether an extraordinary political circumstance (the Contract 
with America, the Obama campaign, the Tea Party Revolution, 
etc.) occurred during the decade being reviewed that benefited 
the party on the national level, but failed to reflect any benefit 
at the state level via an increase in legislative seats, and; 
• Whether the majority party’s membership in the state’s 
congressional delegation significantly outstrips its percentage 
of registered voters on the state level, i.e., whether a party 
holds a supermajority or near supermajority in one or both 
legislative chambers despite its registered voters composing 
50% or less of the electoral populace.   
A finding that several of the above factors are met would warrant court 
intervention and require redistricting with an eye toward equanimity 
between the parties’ registered voters in a majority of districts, allowing 
both parties an equal opportunity to convince the electorate and NPAs of 
their superior position. 
These issues are discussed below in combination to reflect the 
discriminatory effects on the electoral realities and prospects of the 
Democratic Party as affected, the Democrats inability to overcome the 
gerrymander despite the extraordinary national surge of the Democratic 
Party from 2006-2008, and the effectual extinguishment of Democratic 
political influence in the state due to their relegation to superminority 
status. 
A.  Discriminatory Effects 
The intentional discrimination against a political group is patently 
clear, as the intent of redistricting is to obtain a political advantage in the 
electoral process.75  Therefore, the question falls to whether there was a 
discriminatory effect. 
From 2000 onward, the Republican Party of Florida has solidified its 
hold on the Legislature and Congressional Delegation by systematically 
packing and cracking Democratic voters into fewer viable districts via the 
                                                                                                     
 75. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 128–29 (1986) (“[W]henever a legislature 
redistricts, those responsible for the legislation will know . . . whether a particular district is 
a safe one for a Democrat or Republican candidate . . . .  [I]t should not be very difficult to 
prove that the likely political consequences of reapportionment were intended.”). 
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2002 and 2012 reapportionment plans.76  Democrats are almost an 
afterthought within the legislature because they have been relegated to 
superminority status with little hope of regaining any semblance of a 
majority in either house. 
The system put in place in 2002 creates strong protections for 
incumbents and parties.  The best predictor of the party that will win a 
district is whether that party holds even a bare majority in registered voters 
under the 2002 reapportionment system.  As seen, supra, only three Florida 
congressional seats switched parties during the 2000s.  But even more 
telling of the strength of the gerrymander is that there were only 79 of a 
possible 125 challenges made for a congressional seat during the decade, 
and of those races, the party with a minority of registered voters won 
election in only 11 contests totaling 14%. 
A similar pattern holds true for the Florida Senate and House.  In the 
Senate, there were only 60 contested races of a possible 100, and the winner 
from a district representing a minority of its registered voters only occurred 
on 7 occasions or 12% of the time.  In fact, in the 2012 Senate elections, the 
party with the majority of registered voters in a district held sway in 100% 
of the elections.  The House saw less than 50% of possible races contested; 
there were a mere 242 contests out of a possible 600 over the course of the 
decade.  In those races, the winner came from the party with a minority of 
registered voters in the district in 43 elections or 18% of the time.  Of these 
races with a minority party winner, the same generally occurred when the 
district “leaned” or was a “toss-up,” happening 7 of 11 times in “lean/toss-
up” congressional races, 5 of 7 times in “lean/toss-up” state Senate races, 
and 27 of 60 times in “lean/toss-up” state House races. 
Given the data seen in Florida during the past decade, gerrymandering 
has clearly resulted in a discriminatory effect on the Democratic Party.  
Florida’s electoral districts have virtually been locked down to the party 
holding the majority of registered voters in each district, resulting in the 
infeasibility that Democrats could obtain a majority in the Congressional 
Delegation or either chamber of the Florida Legislature.  This trend has 
only continued into the 2010s via the 2012 reapportionment, again 
                                                                                                     
 76. See John Kennedy, Florida’s Redistricting Could Pit Republicans Against Fellow 
Republicans, PALM BEACH POST (Aug. 7, 2011, 10:50PM), http://www.palmbeach 
post.com/news/news/state-regional/floridas-redistricting-could-pit-republicans-again/nLwnt/ 
(noting that after the 2002 redistricting, Republicans held 19 of Florida’s 25 congressional 
districts despite Democrats holding a 600,000-voter edge statewide over Republicans). 
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controlled by the Republican Party, regardless of the state constitutional 
amendments attempting to take politics out of the redistricting equation. 
B.  The Extraordinary Circumstances of 2008 
The Bandemer court declined to act on the Indiana Democrats’ claims 
of Equal Protection Clause violations in part by questioning whether it was 
possible that they could retake either legislative chamber, whether they 
were resigned to minority status for a decade, and whether they would fare 
better following the 1990 decennial census.77  In applying those inquiries to 
the Florida scenario, the answer is no to all three. 
As discussed, supra, there can be extraordinary circumstances that can 
catapult one political party over the other to obtain a surprise majority in a 
single election cycle as occurred in 1994 with the Contract with America.  
The Democrats “extraordinary circumstance” occurred in 2008 behind a 
confluence of events: President Obama’s campaign, President Bush’s 
incredibly low 37% approval rating,78 and the emerging fiscal crisis.  
Nationally, Democrats gained 21 congressional House seats, expanding 
their majority to a 257-178 margin.79  There was an 8-seat gain in the 
United States Senate, raising the Democratic majority (including the two 
Independents) to a 57-43 margin.80  Finally, Barack Obama won the 
presidency with 365 Electoral College votes and by a margin of 10 million 
popular votes.81 
The national trend did not, however, apply to Florida, which President 
Obama carried by almost 250,000 votes.82  There were 23 Congressional 
                                                                                                     
 77. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 135–36 (determining that the District Court erred in 
concluding there was a violation of equal protection in the absence of explicit findings that 
Democrats could not retake either legislative chamber, were resigned to minority status, and 
would have no hope of doing better following the 1990 census). 
 78. George W. Bush Presidential Job Approval, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/ 
poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
 79. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008: ELECTION RESULTS 
FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE, AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 3 
(July 2009), available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalelections2008.shtml 
[hereinafter FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008]. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 5, 13. 
 82. FLA. DEP’T OF STATE DIV. OF ELECTIONS, OFFICIAL RESULTS: PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, available at http://doe.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?Ele 
ctionDate=11/4/2008&DATAMODE= (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
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races for 25 available seats and Democrats gained 1 seat, winning 2 
Republican “leaning” seats and losing 1 “safe” seat.83  Although the final 
total vote tally reflects a 300,000-voter preference for Republicans, the 2 
districts where the incumbent was not contested were Democratic 
strongholds with a combined 500,000 registered Democrats to 110,000 
registered Republicans, which likely would have erased any Republican 
advantage in that vote total.84  Thus, were a majority of votes for Florida’s 
Congressional Delegation to fall for the Democrats or were there a 50/50 
split, the Delegation total would not have changed, and Republicans would 
still hold a 15 to 10 seat advantage over Democrats, which is demonstrable 
evidence of gerrymandering. 
 
 
In the Florida House, again, Democrats only gained 4 seats in races for 
only 56 of 120 available seats.85  Of those 56 races, 33 of the seats 
historically are or were “safe” for Republicans and an additional 6 seats 
historically leaned Republican.  Democrats likely underperformed in the 
state House races as they lost 12 of 15 races where there was a majority 
party switch of registered voters, with the winning candidate coming from 
                                                                                                     
 83. FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008, supra note 79, at 97–100. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Candidate Listing for 2008 General Election, Fla. Dep’t of State, Div. of 
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the minority of a district.  However, in all of those races, the Democratic 
candidate was facing a Republican incumbent, and incumbents are 
notoriously difficult to defeat due to the ingrained name recognition and 
fund raising capabilities.86  Regardless, Democrats were successful in 
carrying just 14 of the 56 races, bringing their total membership in the 
House to 39.87  To have obtained a majority of the House, Democrats would 
have needed to sweep all of the districts where they maintained even a 
slight majority as well as all 9 of the “toss-up” districts with contested 




The Democrats did not fare well in the Senate races either, although 
this appears to be resultant of gerrymandering rather than under-
performance.  To obtain a bare majority, Democrats were required to sweep 
all Democratic districts and all “toss-up” districts, which is impossible to do 
in a single year due to the staggered elections in the Senate.  There were 
                                                                                                     
 86. See JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 234 (2004) (explaining that incumbents are advantaged not only by the 
high cost of mounting campaigns but also by “self-subsidies in the form of press secretaries, 
speechwriters, telephones, office space and so on . . . ”). 
 87. Candidate Listing for 2008 General Election, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF 
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only 12 Senate races, with the Democrats winning 4.88   Six of the districts 
were historically “safe” for Republicans.  Democrats did not gain any 
additional seats in the Senate, leaving them with only 14 members, a mere 
35% of the Senate. 
 
 
A review of the Florida Senate district map, infra, from 2008 reveals 
Senate districts that clearly fail the test of compactness, especially in highly 
populated areas such as the Tampa Bay region, Orlando, Jacksonville, and 
Southeast Florida.  In Tampa Bay, Democrats are packed into District 18, 
which is crescent moon shaped and encompasses parts of four counties 
holding a registered Democratic voter advantage of 110,000; the remaining 
surrounding districts, 10, 13, 16, and 21 are Republican held and have a 
combined registered Republican advantage of 52,000 voters.89 
In the Orlando region, District 19, where Democrats hold a 3-to-1 
registered voter advantage totaling 87,000 voters, is wrapped around a 
bubble protruding from District 9, which holds a 5,000 voter Republican 
majority.90  In Southeast Florida, a Democratic stronghold, Districts 36, 38, 
and 40 are carved out to have a combined advantage of 74,000 registered 
Republican voters; Districts 33, 34, and 35, which adjoin and surround 
these Republican districts, have a combined Democratic voter advantage of 
                                                                                                     
 88. Id. 
 89. FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION BY 
SENATE DISTRICT (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-
registration/statistics/pdf/2008/2008genSenateDist.pdf. 
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244,000.91  The shapes of these districts result in an 8-district swing in the 
Republican Party’s favor due to the discriminatory packing and cracking of 
Democrats in these regions. 
2008 Florida Senate District Map 
 
The above map applied to Florida Senate districts from 2002 onward, 
skewing the majority of seats in favor of the Republican Party, but it is 
most glaring in years such as 2008 when absent the gerrymander, 
Democrats would have a very strong opportunity to reclaim control of the 
Florida Senate based on the overall voter registration and voting patterns in 
Florida.  
 
                                                                                                     
 91. Id. 
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C.  Extinguished Political Influence 
One aspect of Bandemer that Justice Scalia relied on in striking down 
the justiciability of purely political gerrymandering, that a party’s indirect 
influence on political discourse otherwise negates political discrimination, 
fails to take into account political realities and should be remedied in 
applying Bandemer or its successor to the blueprint laid out by Florida’s 
current situation. Democrats have not faced voter suppression in the 
traditional sense whereby they are precluded access to the polls, directly 
violating the Equal Protection Clause.92  However, Bandemer provides: 
[A]s in individual district cases, an equal protection violation may be 
found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages 
certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political process 
effectively.  In this context, such a finding of unconstitutionality must be 
supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority 
of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance 
to influence the political process.93   
Justice Powell’s concurrence in Bandemer derided the plurality’s 
assertion that a loss is “constitutionally insignificant as long as the losers 
are not ‘entirely ignored’ by the winners.”94 He went on to note: 
[T]he facts that the legislature permitted each Democratic voter to cast 
his or her one vote, erected no barriers to the Democratic voters’ 
exercise of the franchise, and drew districts of equal population, are 
irrelevant to a claim that district lines were drawn for the purpose and 
with the effect of substantially debasing the strength of votes cast by 
Democrats as a group.95 
Justice Powell’s concurrence is illuminating, as the mere presence of 
any Democrats in the state legislature would preclude allegations of 
violations of the Equal Protection Clause by Justice Scalia’s reasoning.  
Total dominance by a party via 100% membership control in a legislative 
body is the only thing that could apparently overcome this “indirect 
influence” requirement. 
                                                                                                     
 92. See Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1339 (2002) (stating that the mere 
fact of being outvoted “‘provides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies 
where . . . there is no indication that [the] segment of the population is being denied access 
to the political system’” (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 154–55 (1971))). 
 93. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986). 
 94. Id. at 170 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 95. Id. at 171. 
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However, being “entirely ignored” is not beyond the pale in the event 
that a single party holds a supermajority in both state chambers.  State 
representatives are not solely “in the business of providing constituents with 
government services, such as fire and police protection, schools, utilities, 
and road improvements,”96 and limiting the courts’ view to this aspect of 
the legislature’s job constricts the nature of issues to be considered.  There 
are vast differences in policy outlook regarding the larger issues tackled by 
state legislatures, including creating environmental and transportation 
policy, providing funding for schools and higher education, regulating 
welfare and food stamp distribution, and countless other issues. 
Likewise, the effects of gerrymandering are not limited to in-state 
issues in suppressing a minority party’s political will. Recently, several 
states have floated the proposal of changing the Electoral College from a 
winner-take-all proposition to awarding votes according to the 
congressional districts won in each state.97  The effect in Florida on 
National elections would have been significant; Al Gore would have 
defeated President Bush in the 2000 presidential election.  If the proposition 
were carried to several states, President Obama could have lost in 2008 and 
2012 despite holding a significant advantage in the popular vote in both 
elections.98 
The effect in Florida of Republicans holding a supermajority in both 
houses is that Democrats are unable to pass any policy initiative based on 
the Democratic platform or block any Republican policy initiative that they 
vehemently disagree with.99  The only matters that Democrats may be able 
                                                                                                     
 96. Martinez, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 1339–40. 
 97. See Nia-Malika Henderson & Errin Haines, Republicans in Virginia, Other States 
Seeking Electoral College Changes, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2013), http://articles. 
washingtonpost.com/2013-01-24/politics/36528394_1_electoral-votes-votes-by-congression 
al-district-electoral-college (naming Virginia, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania among 
those proposing the changes). 
 98. See Micah Cohen, Electoral College Changes Would Pose Danger for Democrats, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 25, 2013, 8:47PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01 
/25/electoral-college-changes-would-pose-danger-for-democrats/?_r=0 (claiming that if 
Virginia, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Florida assigned electoral votes by 
congressional district, Obama would have lost the 2012 election). 
 99. See Janet Zink, Gov. Rick Scott Rejects Funding for High-Speed Rail, TAMPA BAY 
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011 (rejecting $2.4 billion in federal funding to build high-speed rail line 
between Tampa and Orlando); Alvarez, Lizette, Florida Higher Education May Face Big 
Budget Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, at A12 (trimming $300 million from higher 
education budget); Mark Memmott, Drug Tests for Welfare Recipients, State Workers 
Ignites Debate in Florida, NPR (June 2, 2011, 10:14AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
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to effect are those that have little to no effect on the state as a whole.  The 
supermajority would even permit veto override if the governor were a 
Democrat, further overriding the will of a majority of the registered voting 
populace. 
D.  The Template to Apply Bandemer to Party Claims of Purely Political 
Gerrymandering 
The above clearly denotes a template for use in claims of purely 
political gerrymandering, yet will generally require a decade of delay prior 
to bringing a suit based on alleged violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  The time required to show that there has been a violation would 
encompass two reapportionment periods, or approximately ten years, so as 
to show a pattern of discrimination and an inability to overcome such. 
The above factors are patently present in Florida denoting purely 
political gerrymandering with a discriminatory effect on the Democratic 
Party, but it is still questionable whether the courts will deign to intervene.  
As noted, supra, Florida’s electorate consists of 22% of registered voters 
not affiliated with any party or who are registered Independents.100  The 
Martinez court’s holding can be read to infer that a court can never interfere 
in the event of purely political gerrymandering cases because electoral 
losses are not the result of gerrymandering, dilution of voting power, or 
violations of equal protection, but rather the failure of the losing party to 
register sufficient voters, campaign well, and turn out voters well enough to 
win. 101 
                                                                                                     
way/2011/06/02/136884455/drug-tests-for-welfare-recipients-state-workers-ignites-debate-
in-florida (requiring drug testing of welfare recipients and new state government hires); 
Arthur Delaney, Florida Unemployment Regime Violates Civil Rights: Labor Department, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/25/florida-
unemployment-civil-rights_n_3154409.html?utm_hp_ref=rick-scott (requiring literacy and 
math tests prior to receiving unemployment benefits regardless of language abilities). 
 100. COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION 2012, supra note 11.  There are a number of 
smaller parties registered in Florida, but the parties are so small and have so few registered 
voters as to render them statistically insignificant for the purposes herein. 
 101. See Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1340 (2002). The court stated that 
even if a political majority could prove:  
[A] history of disproportionate results in conjunction with some other 
evidence in the totality of the circumstances of unconstitutional vote dilution, 
no group will be able to prove a lack of ability to participate in the political 
process.  Any such claim will necessarily be refuted by the logical inference 
to be drawn from a disparity between voting age population and registered 
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It could be argued that the Martinez reasoning may be theoretically 
sound but is certainly not applicable to real-world scenarios.  A court 
viewing such issues rationally and through the prism of real-world 
experiences will not simply toss aside such claims as inactionable.  Rather, 
one hopes that a court considering a claim that purely political 
gerrymandering results in equal protection violations will recognize that 
even in a state with a high percentage of registered voters not affiliated with 
party politics, gerrymandering can make it statistically improbable for the 
party discriminated against to achieve electoral victory, regardless of their 
voter registration and get-out-the-vote efforts.  By example, for Democrats 
to succeed in Congressional districts controlled by Republicans, they would 
need to achieve landslide victories among NPA voters by receiving in 
excess of 66% of their votes and much higher in many districts. 
IV.  What Can Be Done About Gerrymandering? 
It is not likely that the courts will take up the issue of purely political 
gerrymandering in the near future or take action given the current makeup 
of the Supreme Court.  Florida voters have taken an excellent first step in 
addressing the issue by passing amendments to the state constitution, supra, 
but the result has yet to be fully determined as the court cases addressing 
them are still in their early stages.  Should judicial enforcement of the 
constitutional amendments fail, it is incumbent on the Florida Legislature or 
voters to take additional steps to rectify the situation.102 Creating a truly 
                                                                                                     
voters or between registered voters and voter turnout. . . .  A failure to do 
these things will be the actual cause of any inability on the group’s part to 
elect the candidates of its choice and have those candidates represent its 
interests. 
Id. The rejection of minority views by the majority party cannot raise constitutional 
concerns: 
To hold otherwise would be tantamount to holding that ‘it is invidiously 
discriminatory for a [political subdivision] to elect its delegation by a 
majority vote based on party or candidate platforms and so to some extent 
predetermine legislative votes on particular issues.   
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 155 (1971)). 
 102. See Martin Dyckman, Rejected Redistricting Reform of 1993 Haunts Legislature, 
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Mar. 24, 2002), http://www.sptimes.com/2002/03/24/Columns/ 
Rejected_redistrictin.shtml (describing previous failed attempts to amend the Florida 
constitution).  Several efforts were made in 1978, 1993 and 1998 to create a judicial or non-
partisan redistricting commission.  Id.  The 1978 ballot initiative lost at the polls, while the 
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non-partisan redistricting commission will be the most effective way to 
create fairness in the electoral process and it will be the easiest method to 
communicate to the electorate. 
A.  Florida’s Constitutional Amendment 
As noted, supra, Florida’s 2010 constitutional amendments, in theory, 
will preclude political considerations in the redistricting process.  In 
applying to both congressional and state legislative redistricting, the state 
constitution now provides that “[n]o apportionment plan or district shall be 
drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; 
and districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or 
abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to 
participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect 
representatives of their choice . . . .”103  Although the amendments were 
initially challenged on federal constitutional grounds, they have been 
upheld by the Florida Supreme Court as “entirely consistent with the 
Elections Clause, both as to its substance and matter of enactment.”104 
In adopting these provisions, the Florida Constitution places more 
stringent requirements on the redistricting process than does the United 
States Constitution.105  Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court recognized 
the “critical importance of redistricting in ensuring the basic rights of the 
citizens to vote for the representatives of their choice” and that the new 
constraints were intended to “’maximize electoral possibilities by leveling 
the playing field’ for the increased protection of the rights of Florida’s 
citizens . . . .”106  By enacting these amendments, the Florida judiciary’s 
role has been expanded in analyzing the level of compliance the legislature 
meets in preventing partisan influence in redrawing the district maps.107  
However, the new Florida law differs from the analysis of the federal courts 
                                                                                                     
1993 and 1998 efforts were killed in the legislature due to incumbency concerns.  Id. 
 103. FLA. CONST. art. III § 20 (2010). 
 104. Brown v. Sec’y of State of Fla., 668 F.3d 1271, 1285 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 105. See In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 
597, 598–99 (Fla. 2012) (“With the advent of the Fair Districts Amendment, the Florida 
Constitution now imposes more stringent requirements as to apportionment than the United 
States Constitution and prior versions of the state constitution.”). 
 106. Id. at 604–05 (quoting Brown, 668 F.3d at 1285). 
 107. See id. at 607 (“[T]he parameters of the Legislature’s responsibilities under the 
Florida Constitution, and therefore this Court’s scope of review, have plainly increased, 
requiring a commensurately more expanded judicial analysis of legislative compliance.”). 
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under the Equal Protection Clause as provided under Vieth, which looks to 
when partisan districting “‘has gone too far,’” but prohibits wholesale 
partisan intent from the “apportionment plan as a whole and to each district 
individually.”108 
Following passage of these amendments, the 2012 redistricting process 
was conducted by a Republican-dominated legislature with the apparent 
assistance of Republican Party consultants. As a result, the League of 
Women Voters, Common Cause, and a number of individual plaintiffs filed 
lawsuits, now consolidated at the appellate levels, challenging the new 
districts.109   The first of these cases was filed in February, 2012, and they 
are still in the trial discovery phase as the legislature claimed that their 
deliberations in the redistricting process were privileged.  The legislature 
refused to disclose draft maps and documents related to redistricting, and 
they refused to produce legislators and staff for depositions. 
The Supreme Court of Florida heard oral argument on this issue on 
September 16, 2013.  In its opinion, the Court recognized for the first time 
the existence of legislative privilege in Florida, but held that it was not 
absolute, as there is a broad constitutional right to access of public records 
and transparency in the legislative process.110  This legislative privilege 
may yield to a compelling, competing interest111 and that “[p]artisan 
political shenanigans are not ‘state secrets.’”112  To that end, the Court again 
recognizes that the constitutional amendments “mandate prohibiting 
improper partisan or discriminatory intent in redistrict” and “therefore 
quires that discovery e permitted to determine whether the Legislature has 
engage in actions designed to circumvent the constitutional mandate.” 
The Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in this matter is a victory for the 
challengers to the 2012 redistricting, and it appears that it will result in the 
transparency sought by the amendments and recognized by the courts.  
Although the case now continues unabated in the discovery process, a final 
                                                                                                     
 108. Id. at 616–17 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (2004)). 
 109. See Justin Levitt, Litigation in the 2010 Cycle: Florida, ALL ABOUT 
REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases-FL/php#FL (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) 
(listing current Florida redistricting cases). 
 110. The League of Women Voters, et al. v. Florida House of Representatives, No. 
SC13-949; Romo, et al. v. Florida House of Representatives, No. SC13-951, 2013 WL 
6570903, at *1, *9 (Dec. 13, 2013). 
 111. Id. at *9. 
 112. Id. at *6, citing Romo v. Florida House of Representatives 113 So. 3d 117 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2013) (Benton, C.J., dissenting). 
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determination on the concrete impact of the amendments on the Florida 
redistricting process will not likely be reached before 2015 due to the 
probable lengthy appellate process. 
Should the Florida courts enforce the amendment with the 
exactingness dictated by precedent, it must “construe [the] constitutional 
provision[s] consistent with the intent of the framers and the voters” 
examine “the evil sought to be remedied, and the circumstances leading to 
its inclusion” in the constitution “in light of the historical development” of 
the law at the time of its adoption.113   Per the Florida Supreme Court’s 
prior ruling in In re. . . Legislative Apportionment, all redistricting efforts 
must be devoid of political intent: 
[T]here is no acceptable level of improper intent. It does not reference 
the word “invidious” as the term has been used by the United States 
Supreme Court in equal protection discrimination cases, and Florida's 
provision should not be read to require a showing of malevolent or evil 
purpose. Moreover, by its express terms, Florida's constitutional 
provision prohibits intent, not effect, and applies to both the 
apportionment plan as a whole and to each district individually.114 
Accordingly, in theory, the outcome of these court challenges would 
require the legislature to refrain from contemplating political outcomes 
when conducting redistricting.  However, if this proves unavoidably 
difficult, it is feasible that the legislature sua sponte divests itself of its 
redistricting powers to create a truly bipartisan or non-partisan commission 
to undertake the decennial reapportionment within the legislature. 
B.  Creation of a Non-Partisan State Electoral Commission 
A number of states currently use a non-partisan commission to conduct 
their decennial redistricting.115  Other options, such as multi-member 
                                                                                                     
 113. In re Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 614 (Fla. 2012) (quoting 
Zingale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 277, 282 (Fla. 2004); In re Apportionment Law Appearing as 
Senate Joint Resolution 1 E, 1982 Special Apportionment Session; Constitutionality Vel 
Non, 414 So. 2d 1040, 1048 (Fla. 1982); Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 1980). 
 114. In re Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d at 617 (internal citations 
omitted). 
 115. See State by State Redistricting Procedures, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia. 
org/wiki/index.php/State-by-state_redistricting_procedures (last modified Aug. 27, 2013) 
(listing fourteen states that provide for non-legislative/bipartisan redistricting committees: 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington).  
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districts, instant run-offs and proportional representation via preferential 
voting are other options, but will require significant efforts to educate the 
public on their mechanisms. 
The non-partisan commission may be combined with a “top two open 
primary” system whereby all candidates are put on the same ballot 
regardless of party affiliation, and the two candidates receiving the most 
primary votes will run in the general election.116  This method was recently 
effectuated in California with great success in restoring competitiveness in 
races and proportionality to the legislative makeup of its Congressional 
Delegation.117  A number of other states have codified in their state 
constitutions and statutes that partisanship be removed from the 
redistricting process with similar results.118 
This proposed method may not ultimately work to return proportional 
representation to the electoral process as many Florida Democrats self-
locate in metropolitan areas such as South Florida, Tampa Bay, Orlando, 
and Jacksonville, resulting in vast geographical areas where they do not 
maintain a majority.119  However, the first step must be taken to prevent 
further distortion of Florida’s and the nation’s political landscape and well-
being.  As it is unlikely that any majority party will freely abdicate power, 
Florida Democrats would do well to take a two-pronged approach in 
rectifying gerrymandering in the state.  First, they should file an action 
laying out the discriminatory effects of political gerrymandering since 2002 
in hopes that a court would not immediately dismiss it as a non-justiciable 
question.  Second, they must continue efforts to obtain a state constitutional 
amendment via a ballot initiative should the current iterations of the 
amendments prohibiting political considerations be utilized in redistricting 
                                                                                                     
 116.  Congressional & Presidential Primaries: Open, Closed, Semi-Closed and “Top 
Two”, FAIRVOTE.ORG, http://www.fairvote.org/congressional-and-presidential-primaries-
open-closed-semi-closed-and-top-two#.UXcDGL_3DoA (last updated May 2012). 
 117. See CAL. CONST. art. XXI §§ 1–3 (directing the creation of a 14-member “Citizens 
Redistricting Commission”); see also Wang, supra note 8 (noting that California Democrats 
received 62% of the votes cast for the House of Representatives and won 38 of 53 seats, 
exactly matching computer models forecasting the delegation makeup by vote proportion). 
 118. See IDAHO CODE ANN.  §72-1506; IOWA CODE ANN. §42.4; MONT. CODE ANN. §5-
1-115; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §188.010(2); WASH. CONST. art. II §43(5). 
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not be strictly upheld. The constitutional amendment should create a 
bipartisan commission to establish representational districts, thus taking the 
decennial reapportionment out of the hands of the legislature. 
V.  Conclusion 
Despite the clear evidence of gerrymandering in Florida through two 
censuses, disaffected Florida voters will not likely obtain a reprieve from 
the federal courts in this decade and thus have acted accordingly by 
overwhelmingly passing and seeking the enforcement of the above 
discussed constitutional amendments.  If the Florida constitutional 
amendments are ultimately enforced in accord with the plain meaning of 
their language, the results could force the legislature to recuse itself from 
the redistricting process and create a non-partisan commission. 
Although the highest concentrations of Democratic voters lie in 
metropolitan areas such as South Florida, Tampa Bay, Orlando, and 
Jacksonville, they maintain a majority of registered voters in 41-of-67 
Florida counties and a non-partisan redistricting plan would likely bring the 
state and legislative delegations toward an equilibrium more reflective of 
the partisan make-up of the state. Such a non-partisan redistricting plan may 
not be the final cure-all to ease Florida’s proportionally unrepresentative 
electoral woes due to the vagaries of off-year elections, voter motivation, 
and the ever-present NPA voter, but it would certainly be a good first step 
toward restoring fair and proportionate representation at the state legislative 
and Congressional levels. 
